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In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, concerns about policy uncertainty have intensified and 
drawn regulators’ attention. As indicated by Baker et al. (2016), both the Federal Open Market 
Committee and the International Monetary Fund suggest that uncertainty about fiscal, regulatory, 
and monetary policy decisions were major contributors both to the steep economic decline in 2008–
2009 and the slow recoveries afterwards. Many scholars, including Rodrik (1991), Hassett and 
Metcalf (1999), Pastor and Veronesi (2012), Waisman et al. (2015), Gulen and Ion (2016), Nguyen 
and Phan (2017), Bonaime et al. (2018), and Nguyen et al. (2018), treat policy uncertainty as 
detrimental for economic growth. 
Although these studies provide useful insights on the impact of uncertainty on firms and the real 
economy, some of these adverse effects may reflect the indirect effects on corporate behavior of 
any reduced bank output. That is, part of the observed reductions in economic activity may be due 
to changed bank behavior, rather than to any direct effects on firms. But we still know relatively 
little about how policy-induced economic uncertainty might influence the decision-making of 
financial institutions. Only a few papers have focused on this aspect. Bordo et al. (2016), for 
example, document a negative effect of policy uncertainty on bank lending, while Berger et al. 
(2018) show that policy uncertainty reduces the supply of banking services. 
This paper tries to extend this literature by examining how political connections could mitigate the 
adverse impact of policy uncertainty on banks. From a theoretical perspective, ex ante, access to 
political insiders can provide banks with better access to legislative proposals under consideration. 
Politically connected banks can also gain a superior understanding of how policymakers will react 
to various alternatives, and thus assess the likelihood of legislative outcomes with greater precision. 
In both ways, connected banks would face a reduced level of policy uncertainty compared to their 
unconnected counterparts. Ex post, the adverse effect of policy uncertainty comes from the potential 
cost of making the “wrong” decision, but this cost can be mitigated if the bank is politically 
connected. There is ample empirical evidence that politically connected banks enjoy a higher 
probability of bailout in times of distress. So, a moral hazard–based theory would predict politically 
connected banks to be less conservative in the face of policy uncertainty compared to their 
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unconnected competitors. Taking these observations together, we hypothesize that the adverse 
effect of economic policy uncertainty would be less severe for politically connected banks. 
To test this question empirically, we rely on a full sample of commercial banks and savings’ 
institutions in the US over a 29-year period. Policy uncertainty is measured by the newspaper-based 
economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index proposed and constructed by Baker et al. (2016). To 
capture banks’ political connections, we follow Cohen et al. (2011), Duchin and Sosyura (2012), 
and Kostovetsky (2015), to use a geographic-based measure of political connections: whether a 
bank is headquartered in a state with a senator on the influential Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs (hereafter “Senate Banking Committee”). Finally, banks’ reactions are 
captured by their risk-taking behaviors, as measured by the loss provision to loan volume ratio 
(Dinger and Von Hagen, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Casu et al., 2011; Klomp and Haan, 2012; 
Khan et al., 2017). 
In line with previous studies, we find banks to be more conservative when facing policy 
uncertainty. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in policy uncertainty increases banks’ 
loss provision to loan volume ratio by 15 percent. What is new and interesting is that the adverse 
effect of policy uncertainty on banks is alleviated partially when banks are politically connected, 
despite the fact that, in general, connected banks are more cautious. For an increase of one standard 
deviation in the policy-uncertainty index, connected banks would maintain a loss provision to loan 
volume ratio that is almost seven percent lower compared to the unconnected banks. 
We then conduct several robustness checks to validate our findings. First, we apply a geographical 
regression discontinuity design, following Holmes (1998) and Mian et al. (2015), to address the 
potential endogeneity concern that Senate Banking Committee representation might not be assigned 
randomly across different states. Specifically, we restrict our sample to counties that are 
geographically close to either side of a state border. These nearby counties are more similar to each 
other than they are to counties farther away from the borders. So, when we compare banks located 
in these counties, it is less likely that Senate Banking Committee representation captures some 
omitted across-state differences. In other words, the assignment of Senate Banking Committee 
representation is more random among these banks close to state borders. The findings are very 
similar, both statistically and economically. 
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Similarly, in another robustness check, we exclude New York State from our regression because it 
is a financial industry hub and is the only state that always gets Senate Banking Committee 
representation. We also drop the states that have never got representation in the Senate Banking 
Committee. Both of these subsample analyses are designed to further exclude the possible bias of 
the unevenly dispersed committee connections that may relate to omitted state level characteristics. 
Again, the findings remain unaffected. 
Second, we conduct a placebo test where the Senate Banking Committee is replaced by other 
powerful, but unrelated, committees, such as the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry (hereafter “Senate Agriculture Committee”) and the Senate Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources (hereafter “Senate Energy Committee”). The rational is that if our prediction is 
correct, the mitigation impact should come only from connections to relevant politicians, and not 
from committee representations that are irrelevant to the banking sector. The estimates are in line 
with this expectation that connections to unrelated committees do not contribute to the mitigation of 
policy uncertainty. 
We further corroborate our findings by examining the heterogeneity across banks of different sizes 
and over time with changing levels of regulatory strictness. First, from a practical perspective, 
compared to smaller banks, larger banks often operate beyond state borders and are able to exert 
influence over senators in other states. Larger banks may also get connections with regulators of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve System. In contrast, smaller 
banks, which operate mostly within their home states, are more likely to be affected by their home 
state representation in the Senate Banking Committee. Indeed, we find our results to be driven 
mainly by smaller banks, rather than larger ones. 
Second, banking regulation has evolved dramatically in the US. In the early years, the banking 
sector was regulated heavily. The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, enacted on November 12, 1999, 
repealed part of the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933, removing barriers to consolidation among 
commercial banks, investment banks, securities’ firms, and insurance companies. So, since 2000, 
the banking market in the US was less regulated and became more volatile, leading finally to the 
2008/09 global financial crisis. In response to the crisis, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act was enacted on July 21, 2010. The law overhauled the financial 
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regulation in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and it made changes affecting all federal financial 
regulatory agencies and almost every part of the nation's financial services’ industry. Once again, 
regulation of the banking market became stricter. Theoretically, rent arising from political 
connections would decrease during times of loosened regulations, so the role of political 
connections in mitigating the effect of policy uncertainty should be less pronounced. This is 
supported by our findings that the impact was stronger before 2000 and after 2010, but somehow 
disappeared in between these years. 
Our paper contributes to at least two strands of literature. The first is research on the impact of 
policy uncertainty on firms and economic activities. Theoretical work on this topic dates back to 
Bernanke (1983) and is followed by many papers, including Rodrik (1991), Hassett and Metcalf 
(1999), Bloom (2009), Bachmann et al., (2013), Born and Pfeifer (2014), Fernández-Villaverde et 
al. (2015), Scotti (2016), Jens (2017), and Bloom et al. (2018). However, part of the observed 
reductions in economic activity may be a result of changed bank behavior, and very little is known 
about the way in which policy uncertainty might influence the behavior of financial institutions 
(Bordo et al., 2016; Berger et al., 2018). There is also a clear lack of research identifying ways to 
alleviate the adverse effect of policy uncertainty. Therefore, our paper contributes to this strand of 
the literature by examining how policy uncertainty adversely affects banks’ risk-taking behavior, 
and, more importantly, the role of political connections in mitigating this adverse impact of policy 
uncertainty on banks. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on the economic impact of political connections. In her 
seminal work, Johnson (1960) describes how economic agents receive favorable treatment over 
their competitors through government means. Many empirical studies have verified the benefits of 
political connections. For example, Faccio et al. (2006) find that politically connected agents are 
significantly more likely to be bailed out than are similar unconnected peers. Regulators are also 
much less likely to initiate enforcement actions against politically connected banks (Lambert, 
2019). These studies largely focus on government actions; however, our paper shows that having 
political connections in place would also affect the behavior of the economic agents, especially in 
times of high policy uncertainty. In other words, we show that political connections can benefit 
banks via mitigating the adverse effect of economic policy uncertainty. 
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Our research is also policy-relevant. Regulators have realized the detrimental impact of economic 
policy uncertainty for firms and the economy as a whole. Government authorities are taking various 
actions to reduce the level of uncertainty in their legislative processes. However, little is known 
about how financial institutions react to these uncertainties, and even less is known about how to 
deal with the adverse effects of policy uncertainty from the perspective of the economic agents. In 
this paper, we show that the detrimental impact of policy uncertainty on banks could be partially 
mitigated by political connections. Theoretically, political connections can help to directly reduce 
the uncertainty that banks face in the legislative process, which is beneficial. However, access to 
political resources might also reduce the cost of making the “wrong” decision and induce banks to 
take on more risk. This moral hazard issue may harm the stability of the financial system and 
significantly increase the tax burden, because government bailouts of banks are costly (Blau et al., 
2013). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our hypothesis. A data description 
and summary statistics are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the methodology and results. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis 
As indicated by Baker et al. (2016), both the Federal Open Market Committee and the International 
Monetary Fund have blamed economic policy uncertainty as a major contributor to not only the 
2008/09 global financial crisis but also the slow recoveries afterwards. Since then, many scholars 
have noticed the disruptive effect of policy uncertainty on firms and economic activities. As a 
result, the ability to cope with uncertainties surrounding economic policy decisions is becoming 
indispensable for any modern firm. Therefore, market participants need to adjust their actions when 
they face significant uncertainty regarding the timing, content, and impact of policy decisions by 
regulators.  
The impact is likely to be stronger for banks, as the banking industry in most countries is subject to 
a tight set of regulations. In addition to the general economic policies that affect the universe of 
firms, regulations such as bailout policies, capital–reserve requirements, and entry restrictions will 
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all directly and specifically affect banks. However, the adverse effects of economic policy 
uncertainty on banks could be mitigated via political connections, both ex ante and ex post. 
Ex ante, access to political insiders can directly reduce the level of policy uncertainty that banks 
face. Uncertainty comes from information asymmetry, or, in other words, the heterogeneity in 
policy alternatives that regulators face and the difficulty in predicting regulators’ response to these 
alternatives (Wellman, 2017). When considering the choice among various policy alternatives, 
regulators face difficulties over how the market will react to their policy decisions and what the real 
impacts of their decisions are (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). To reduce these difficulties, regulators have 
an opportunity to engage in communication with market participants to discover their policy 
preferences and the expected consequences of the policy decisions (Schuler et al., 2002).  
However, it is unlikely that all market participants will have an equal opportunity for 
communication. In practice, as shown by Hillman and Hitt (1999), better access is often granted to 
those banks that maintain good working relationships, or have close ties, with regulators. Therefore, 
political connections can provide banks with increased ability to interact with regulators and, hence, 
superior access to legislative information. 
Political connections can further decrease the level of policy uncertainty by influencing the quality 
of information received. For instance, connected banks can enjoy “face time” with high-ranked 
officers in regulatory institutions, rather than a member of their staff (Hojnacki and Kimball, 2001). 
Moreover, though the legislative process can produce an abundance of information and possible 
alternatives, connected banks would have a greater understanding of the regulators’ policy 
preferences (Austen-Smith, 1995). This increased understanding of the factors that comprise the 
policymaker’s objective function allows connected banks to assess the likelihood of certain 
legislative outcomes with greater precision. Therefore, politically connected banks not only enjoy 
differential access to the legislative proposals under consideration but also gain a better 
understanding of how policymakers will react to various alternatives and ultimately reduce the level 
of policy uncertainty they face. 
Ex post, politically connected banks are better protected even if they have made the “wrong” 
decision when facing economic policy uncertainty. In other words, political connections can 
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mitigate the adverse effects of policy uncertainty via providing banks with stronger protection. 
Theoretical work on the impact of policy uncertainty dates back to Bernanke (1983). In his model, 
decisions are irreversible and cannot be altered once pursued. But useful information in assessing 
the “correctness” of the decision only arrives over time. By waiting, firms become more informed 
and are more likely to make the “correct” decision. Under these conditions, firms trade off the 
returns from early commitment against the cost of making the “wrong” decision by not waiting for 
additional information. 
However, the cost of making the “wrong” decision can be mitigated if the bank is politically 
connected. Empirical evidence has shown that politically connected banks enjoy a higher 
probability of bailout in times of distress. Using a cross-country sample, this is confirmed by Faccio 
et al. (2006). Dam and Koetter (2012) further show that the risk-taking behavior by German banks 
responds to changes in bailout expectations from political connections. Therefore, the cost of 
making the “wrong” decision is much lower for banks with political connections, so they would be 
less affected by economic policy uncertainty. A moral hazard–based theory would predict 
politically connected banks to be less conservative in the face of policy uncertainty. 
We now take the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as a result of the 2008/09 crisis, when 
economic policy uncertainty was rather high, as an example to show how political connections can 
mitigate the adverse effects of policy uncertainty in practice. 
It is well known that deliberations on such a government intervention took place largely in private 
meetings between regulators and selected financial institutions (Jagolinzer et al., 2020). More 
importantly, details regarding the application and qualification process for funds from TARP were 
not publicly disclosed. So ex ante, either banks with good working experience with the regulators or 
those with closer ties are more likely to be involved in the legislative process. As a result, connected 
banks are likely to be more informed, which directly reduces the level of uncertainty. Ex post, 
political connections appear to have also played a role in the allocation of TARP funds (Sorkin, 
2010; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012). For example, Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find that banks’ 
connections to powerful government officials in Congress and to the Federal Reserve System 
correspond to a higher likelihood of receiving TARP capital. In other words, banks with better 
political connections are more likely to be saved when they are in distress. Thus, connected banks 
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are less affected by policy uncertainty because the cost of making the “wrong” decision is lower, 
and they can take on more risk when facing it. 
Taking these observations together, we hypothesize that the adverse effect of economic policy 
uncertainty is less severe for politically connected banks. 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
Measuring the policy uncertainty generated by regulatory and political systems has been 
challenging for scholars. The main challenge is the difficulty to disentangle policy-induced 
uncertainty from general economic uncertainty, such as stock market volatility. Another difficulty is 
that it is not clear which events should be classified as causing policy-induced uncertainty, and nor 
is it clear how to measure the degree of policy uncertainty that an event may cause. In this paper, 
we measure Policy uncertainty by the innovative EPU of Baker et al. (2016), which is based on 
textual analysis of newspaper articles. Detailed variable definitions and data sources can be found in 
Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
This economic policy uncertainty index is able to capture uncertainty about who will make 
economic policy decisions, what economic policy actions will be undertaken and when, and the 
economic effects of these policy actions or inactions. As a result, this policy uncertainty index has 
significantly promoted research on the consequences of policy uncertainty in several recent studies 
(Gulen and Ion, 2016; Julio and Yook, 2016; Nguyen and Phan, 2017; Bonaime et al., 2018; 
Nguyen et al., 2018). For ease of interpretation, we standardize the Policy uncertainty index by 
subtracting its time-series mean and dividing by its standard deviation. The time-series trend of 
economic policy uncertainty in the US is presented in Figure 1. For example, we see a huge spike in 
uncertainty during the 2008/09 global financial crisis. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
To capture banks’ political connections, we follow Cohen et al. (2011), Duchin and Sosyura (2012), 
and Kostovetsky (2015), to use a geographic-based measure of political connections; that is, 
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whether a bank is headquartered in a state with a senator on the Senate Banking Committee. In the 
US, each state is represented by two senators, but not all senators have the same power to assist the 
banks headquartered in their home states. A major amount of such power comes from a seat on the 
relevant Senate Banking Committee. The committee’s areas of jurisdiction include banking, 
insurance, financial markets, securities, international trade and finance, and economic policy. 
Members of the committee write legislation in these areas and oversee the executive departments 
and other government agencies regulating the financial industry. These oversight powers provide 
Senate Banking Committee members with a great deal of leverage to influence government 
decisions that affect the financial industry.  
Specifically, the historical membership of the Senate Banking Committee is drawn from the annual 
volumes of the Official Congressional Directory. The Directory lists the names (and the home 
states) of each senator on each Senate committee. For each bank in a certain quarter of a year, we 
define the dummy, Connected bank, which equals 1 if the bank is headquartered in a state with a 
senator on the Senate Banking Committee and 0 otherwise. As shown in Table 2, on average, 
approximately 44 percent of banks have Senate Banking Committee representation in a certain 
quarter of a year. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
As pointed out by Kostovetsky (2015), there are three reasons why the use of Senate Banking 
Committee representation is a proper measure of banks’ political connections. First, committee 
members have strong power to affect the banking industry. The committee’s legislative record 
includes the major acts that govern the banking industry. Examples include the 1980 Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, which phased out interest rate ceilings on 
deposits, expanded powers over thrifts, and raised the deposit insurance coverage to $100,000; the 
1994 Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act that permitted interstate 
expansion; the 1999 Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, which allowed financial holding companies to offer 
banking, securities, and insurance products under one corporate roof; and the legislation on and 
oversight of the TARP program during the 2008/09 financial crisis. 
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Second, even after the bank branching deregulation that came after the 1980s, most banks still 
operate within state boundaries and often have the name of the state in their names, e.g., First Texas 
Bank. So, it is appropriate to look at senators who represent individual states. Banks that are located 
in a state with a senator on the Senate Banking Committee potentially have a powerful ally that can 
either reduce the level of policy uncertainty by revealing superior information or improve their 
chances of survival when they are in distress. In addition, it is very unlikely that banks move across 
state borders to exploit the potential benefits from Senate Banking Committee representation, 
because the cost of moving from one state to another is rather high. 
Third, having a connection to the Senate Banking Committee is not a choice variable of the bank. 
The banking industry is well dispersed across the US, much better than in most other industries, so 
the Banking Committee representation is not significantly related to the density of banks. This is 
shown in Figure 2. We can see that the membership of the Senate Banking Committee includes 
senators from most regions of the country, from large states and from small states, from largely 
urban states and from largely rural states, with different levels of bank density. This is in contrast 
with the Agriculture or Energy Committee, where the committee representation is mostly from farm 
and oil states. According to the Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, for 
committees such as Banking, a senator is mainly assigned to a committee to “match the legislator’s 
skills, expertise, and policy concerns.” 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
To capture how banks are affected by policy uncertainty and their resulting risk-taking behaviors, 
we utilize the loss provision to loan volume ratio (Loss provision/Loan volume), which has been 
applied widely in previous studies (Dinger and Von Hagen, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Casu et al., 
2011; Klomp and Haan, 2012; Khan et al., 2017). Banks are financial intermediaries that primarily 
collect deposits and issue loans to individuals, firms, and governments to finance their consumption 
or investment. As a result, banks are vulnerable to loan default arising from either deteriorating 
economic conditions or idiosyncratic risks, which affects borrowers’ ability to repay, requiring 
banks to maintain sufficient loss provisions in anticipation of expected loan losses (Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2003). Intuitively, high loss provision to loan volume ratios are able to increase banks’ 
ability to absorb losses without either becoming financially distressed or failing, if all else is held 
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constant (Koch and Wall, 2000). Due to the forward-looking nature of loss provisions, together with 
the fact that bank managers have significant discretion in the determination of the estimates, 
changes in loss provision to loan volume ratios are able to reflect the changes in banks’ risk-taking 
behaviors.  
From the regulators perspective, loss provision to loan volume ratios have also been important 
throughout the Basel Accords. Loan loss provisions account for 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets 
in Tier 2 capital under Basel I. The inclusion of loss provisions in the computation of regulatory 
capital allow banks with low regulatory capital to increase loss provisions as a compensation. Under 
Basel II, the provisioning model anticipates loan losses before they materialize. In the standardized 
approach, banks include loss provisions up to a maximum of 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets. 
More recently, in Basel III, loss provisions are determined based on the expected through-the-cycle 
loan loss provisioning system. This provisioning system anticipates expected losses and requires 
banks to set aside specific provisions on newly-originated loans based on individual borrower 
characteristics that drive the performance of the loans. 
Regarding the controls, we include a set of bank characteristics, such as Total assets, ROA, ROA 
volatility, Dividend ratio, and Cash ratio, which might also affect banks’ risk-taking behaviors. For 
example, larger banks are likely to grant more loans even without a commensurate increase in loss 
provisions. ROA may have a positive impact on loan volume and a negative impact on loss 
provisions, whereas the converse is true for the volatility of ROA. In addition, dividend-paying 
banks may have a higher level of loss provisions, which could be attributed to having more 
resources, and they may also be more conservative in lending. Finally, to achieve more cash 
reserves, banks may reduce both loan volume and loss provisions. All banking information is 
obtained from the quarterly Call & Thrift Financial Reports and the Summary of Deposits, issued 
by the FDIC. Our final sample covers all commercial banks and savings’ institutions in the US over 
a 29-year period (from 1985 to 2013).  
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1 Methodology 
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To empirically test our hypothesis that political connections can mitigate the adverse effect of 
policy uncertainty for banks, we estimate the following regression model: 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛⁄ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑞 = 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑠 𝑖⁄ + 
𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑞 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑞 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑞 
+𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑞 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑞 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑞       (1) 
where bank i is headquartered in state s in year y and quarter q. In addition to the set of bank-level 
control variables, we include the quarter fixed effects for possible seasoning effects that may bias 
our estimates. In different specifications, we also include state or bank fixed effects to tease out all 
time-invariant differences across states or banks. Finally, standard errors are clustered at the bank 
level. 
This is a semi difference-in-differences setting where we are interested in whether politically 
connected banks are less cautious than are their unconnected peers in times of high policy 
uncertainty. So, before turning to the multivariate estimations, we start with a univariate analysis 
that can give us a vivid illustration of this difference-in-differences setting. The results are 
presented in Table 3, where we divide our sample into periods with high or low levels of policy 
uncertainty (based on whether Policy uncertainty is above or below its time-series mean). The 
variable of interest is the Loss provision/Loan volume ratio. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In the first layer of difference, we find that banks are taking a significantly higher loss provision to 
loan volume ratio in periods with high policy uncertainty, irrespective of whether the bank is 
politically connected. The second layer of difference comes from the comparison between 
connected and unconnected banks. In times of high policy uncertainty, unconnected banks increase 
their loss provision to loan volume ratio by 0.37 percent, whereas the increase is only 0.19 percent 
for connected banks. In other words, when facing high policy uncertainty, politically connected 
banks would maintain a loss provision to loan volume ratio that is 0.18 percent lower than is that of 
their unconnected competitors. Again, the difference is significant at the 1 percent level. Taken 
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together, the univariate results validate our difference-in-differences setting and indicate that 
political connections are indeed able to mitigate the adverse effect of policy uncertainty on banks. 
4.2. Baseline Results 
The multivariate results are presented in Table 4. We start with a basic specification where no fixed 
effects are included. Then, quarter fixed effects are controlled for the seasonal effects, together with 
state fixed effects. In another specification, we replace state fixed effects with bank fixed effects. In 
columns (1)–(3), we first validate that banks are more cautious during times of high policy 
uncertainty, which is consistent with previous studies. In other words, when facing a higher level of 
uncertainty regarding policy decisions, banks are likely to apply a more conservative loan loss 
provision strategy. Economically, with a one standard deviation increase in policy uncertainty, 
banks increase their loss provision to loan volume ratio by 15 percent compared to its mean. 
Then, in columns (4)–(6), we continue to test our hypothesis that political connections can mitigate 
the adverse effects of policy uncertainty on banks. In line with our hypothesis, the estimates show 
that politically connected banks are less conservative than are their unconnected peers in times of 
high policy uncertainty. Economically, with a one standard deviation increase in the level of policy 
uncertainty, connected banks would maintain a loss provision to loan volume ratio that is almost 7 
percent lower compared to the unconnected banks. Therefore, the findings support our hypothesis 
that political connections can mitigate the adverse effects of economic policy uncertainty on banks. 
We also find that in stable times, politically connected banks are more cautious in respect of lending 
than are their unconnected competitors. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Turning to other covariates, we find that larger banks (higher Total assets) and more profitable 
banks (higher ROA) are, in general more aggressive, in that they maintain a lower loss provision to 
loan volume ratio. But banks with higher volatility of ROA are found to be more conservative in 
lending. Similarly, banks that pay out more dividends (higher Dividend ratio) and have more cash 
reserves (higher Cash ratio) tend to maintain a higher level of loss provision to loan volume ratio 
and, thus, are also more cautious in their lending. These results are mostly consistent with the usual 
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findings in the literature (e.g., Kostovetsky, 2015; Bordo et al., 2016). In the latter tables, we omit 
the estimates for these covariates. 
In Table A1 of the appendix, we further disentangle the two components of the loss provision to 
loan volume ratio and find significant results for both components. When facing an increase in the 
level of economic policy uncertainty, in general, banks cut their lending, which is in line with the 
findings of Bordo et al. (2016) and Berger et al. (2018). At the same time, banks also increase their 
levels of loss provision to provide more cushioning for potential negative outcomes in the future. 
However, these adverse effects of policy uncertainty are mitigated significantly if a bank is 
politically connected. For connected banks, the negative impact of policy uncertainty on loan 
volume is reduced significantly and is close to disappearing. Connected banks also impose a smaller 
increase in their loss provisions. Taken together, the decomposition indicates that the impacts of 
policy uncertainty and political connections materialize through both loan volumes and loss 
provisions. 
4.3. Robustness Checks 
Even though we have shown in Figure 2 that the banking industry is much better dispersed than are 
most other industries in the US, and the density of banks is not correlated with the Senate Banking 
Committee representation, one may still be concerned that new senators might base their choice of 
committee assignment on certain characteristics of their home states This would create a spurious 
correlation between committee membership and banks’ risk-taking behavior because the conjecture 
we investigate treats the Senate Banking Committee as an exogenous variable. In other words, there 
is a potential endogeneity concern that Senate Banking Committee representation might not be 
assigned randomly across different states. 
To address this issue, we apply a geographical regression discontinuity design, as in Holmes (1998) 
and Mian et al. (2015), to restrict our sample to counties that are geographically close to either side 
of a state border. The rationale is that counties close to the same state border are generally more 
similar to each other than they are to counties that are farther away from the borders. Therefore, 
when we restrict our sample to only those banks located in these border counties, Senate Banking 
Committee representation is less likely to capture the impact of unobserved differences across 
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states. In other words, the assignment of Senate Banking Committee representation is more random 
among those banks that are close to state borders.  
Specifically, we obtain each county’s distance to a state border from Holmes (1998) and keep only 
the samples of banks (first) within 40 km and (second) within 50 km of a state border. These two 
numbers correspond to the mean and median US county width. Theoretically, the banking markets 
in these border countries are likely to be more homogeneous and, thus the allocation of Senate 
Banking Committee is more likely to be random. The estimates are presented in Table 5. We find 
similar results to those in Table 4, both statistically and economically. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
New York State is a financial industry hub and, from Figure 2, we find it to be the only state that 
always gets a Senate Banking Committee representation during our sampling period. There are also 
some states that never get a senator in the Banking Committee from 1976 (when the Call reports 
began to be released) until the end of our sampling period; these states include Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Iowa, Maine, Vermont, and Washington DC.1 So, the assignment of Senate Banking 
Committee representation in both New York State and these never-connected states may not be 
random. To address this concern, in Table 6, we apply three subsample analyses to exclude either 
New York State or those never-connected states, or both, to further address the possible bias of the 
unevenly dispersed committee connections that may relate to omitted state level characteristics. 
Again, the findings remain unaffected, both from a statistical perspective and from an economical 
point of view. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We also conduct a placebo test, where the Senate Banking Committee is replaced by two other 
powerful, but unrelated, US committees (Senate Agriculture Committee and Senate Energy 
Committee). This is to address potential concern that our measure of political connections simply 
reflects the general power of a certain state, thereby invalidating our hypothesis. The Senate 
                                                          
1 Except for Washington DC, the other six states mentioned above (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Maine, and 
Vermont) were also once connected in the Banking Committee before 1976. 
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Agriculture Committee is empowered with legislative oversight of all matters relating to the 
nation's agriculture industry, farming programs, forestry and logging, and legislation relating to 
nutrition and health. The Senate Energy Committee has jurisdiction over matters related to energy 
and nuclear waste policy, territorial policy, native Hawaiian matters, and public lands.  
Both committees are not related to affairs either in the banking industry or, even more generally, in 
the financial sector; thus, if our hypothesis is valid, we would expect to find no significant impact 
on reducing the adverse effects of policy uncertainty. In other words, if our prediction is correct, the 
mitigation impact should come only from connections to relevant politicians and not from 
committee representations that are irrelevant to the banking sector. The results are shown in Table 7 
and are in line with our expectation. Connections to unrelated committees (Senate Agriculture 
Committee and Senate Energy Committee) do not contribute to the mitigation of policy uncertainty, 
both statistically and economically. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In the appendix, we try to further tease out the possible impact of economic conditions. First, in 
Table A2, we include year fixed effects or year*quarter fixed effects to control for common 
economic conditions that do not vary across states. In another specification, we further control for 
the interactions between our control variables and policy uncertainty. Second, in Table A3, we take 
into account the possibility that our results are driven by housing bubbles. To rule out this 
possibility, we control for the quarterly MSA-level housing-price growth rates from the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency.2 It is also documented in the literature that there is a negative correlation 
between uncertainty and business cycles (e.g., Bloom, 2014). So, our results may capture the impact 
of recessions. To address this issue, we control for economic recessions defined by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. There is a tight economic link between the US and Canada (e.g., 
Romalis, 2007). So, by extracting the US policy uncertainty index orthogonal to Canada’s policy 
uncertainty index, we can eliminate the contaminating part of economic conditions (Gulen and Ion, 
2016). Overall, in all specifications, our findings are robust. 
                                                          
2 Notice that we lose more than one half of the observations because no housing price data are available where a great 
many banks are located. 




The US banking market consists not only of some large banks but also a large number of relatively 
small banks. This banking market structure results largely from a legal framework that, in the past, 
restricted banks’ ability to diversify geographically.  
From a practical perspective, large banks usually have branches both in their home states and across 
several other states. As a result, these large banks are able to exert influence over senators beyond 
their home states. Large banks may also get connections with regulators of FDIC and the Federal 
Reserve System. This is also true even if a large bank has branches only in its home state, because 
large banks often have more resources to lobby and exert influence beyond senators from their 
home states. Therefore, Senate Banking Committee representation from their home states might not 
be that important for large banks. For instance, the Bank of America and Wells Fargo are two of the 
“Big Four” banks in the US, with operations all over the country. Their headquarters are based in 
North Carolina and California, respectively. However, their influence is deemed to be so far beyond 
their home states that they are able to lobby directly high-ranked officials in Washington DC and 
New York City. 
In contrast, smaller banks, which mostly operate within their home states and lack sufficient 
resources to lobby, are more likely to be affected by their home state representation in the Senate 
Banking Committee. Examples include small banks that often have the name of the states in their 
names;  e.g., the First Texas Bank and the Bank of Arkansas. At the same time, the large number of 
small banks are important in stimulating the local economy and stabilizing the employment, so 
senators are likely to show no less concern about these small banks compared to their larger peers. 
Therefore, Senate Banking Committee representation from their home states is likely to be more 
crucial for small banks. 
To examine if this is the case, we divide our banks into large and small ones based on their total 
assets. We consider banks with total assets larger than the 75th percentile as large banks and the 
remaining ones as small banks. The results are shown in Table 8. Generally, we find that both large 
and small banks are more conservative during times of high policy uncertainty. The economic 
magnitudes are also comparable, indicating that both large and small banks are affected by 
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economic policy uncertainty in a similar way. Interestingly, we find that the mitigating effect of 
political connection is valid only for small banks and not for large ones. This is in line with our 
expectation that Senate Banking Committee representation is more important for small banks than it 
is for large banks. The scope of large banks in influencing regulators goes well beyond the state 
borders. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
This finding is important for policy makers, because small banks play a critical role in the US 
banking system and are particularly important in rural and small metropolitan areas. Small banks 
are key providers of certain products, such as small business loans and farm loans. The community 
focus of small banks enables them to develop and maintain relationships with customers in a way 
that large banks without a deep local presence cannot. Through these interactions, they obtain 
information about borrowers that large banks generally do not have. As a result, small banks are 
able to make loans to borrowers who might not qualify under large banks’ standardized lending 
criteria. 
During our sample period from 1985 to 2013, the banking regulation framework in the US changed 
dramatically. Before the 1990s, the banking sector was under strict regulations. This period ended 
gradually with a series of deregulations. Starting with the Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, interstate banking restrictions were eliminated gradually in two 
phases. The first phase was September 29, 1995 when well-managed and well-capitalized banks 
were allowed to acquire banks in other states. The second phase followed on June 1, 1997, when 
banks in different states were allowed to merge into truly nationwide banks. The Glass–Steagall Act 
of 1933 was also partially repealed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act enacted on November 12, 
1999, which allowed consolidation among commercial banks, investment banks, securities’ firms, 
and insurance companies. So, after 2000, the banking market in the US was in a period with much 
less regulation, until the collapse that was the 2008/09 financial crisis. In response to the crisis, the 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was enacted on July 21, 2010. The 
law overhauled the financial regulation in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and it made changes 
affecting all federal financial regulatory agencies and almost every part of the nation's financial 
services’ industry. Once again, regulation of the banking market became stricter. 
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Therefore, there are three clearly different phases during our sampling period based on the strictness 
of banking market regulations; these phases are pre-2000, between 2000 and 2010, and post-2010. 
Regulations were much tighter in the pre-2000 and post-2010 periods but were significantly 
loosened in between. As the impact of political connections is related closely to the level of 
regulation that banks face, we would naturally expect a stronger impact whenever regulation is 
stricter.  
This is examined empirically in Table 9. The estimates show that the role of political connections in 
mitigating the adverse effects of policy uncertainty on banks is stronger before 2000 and after 2010, 
when the banking industry was regulated strictly. However, the impact is much weaker, or even 
disappears, in between. One possible explanation is that the rent arising from political connections 
in times of high policy uncertainty declines after the implementation of bank deregulation. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
The global financial crisis has created concerns about policy uncertainty among practitioners and 
regulators around the world. More recently, the concerns have been intensifying in the face of rising 
political polarization, the increase in populism and nationalism, the changing role of the 
government, and the growing number of uncertainty-increasing events such as the Brexit and the 
trade war between the US and China.  
Policy uncertainty has been treated as detrimental for firms. More importantly, policy uncertainty is 
largely out of managerial control and entails a systemic risk for the whole economy. There is 
limited evidence on how policy-induced economic uncertainty might influence banks’ decision-
making. However, there is a clear lack of research on how to alleviate the adverse effect of policy 
uncertainty on banks. 
In this paper, we partially fill this gap to show that banks are more conservative in lending when 
facing high policy uncertainty, but this adverse effect is alleviated when banks are politically 
connected. Economically, for an increase of one standard deviation in the policy uncertainty index, 
connected banks would maintain a loss provision to loan volume ratio that is almost 7 percent lower 
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compared to that of unconnected banks. The findings are robust to both a geographical regression 
discontinuity design and a placebo test. 
We further validate our findings by examining the heterogeneity across banks with different sizes 
and over time with changing levels of regulatory strictness. First, we find our results to be driven 
mainly by smaller banks that operate mostly within their home states and, thus, are more likely to 
be affected by their home state representation in the Senate Banking Committee. Second, as the rent 
arising from political connections would decrease in times of loosened regulations, we find the role 
of political connections in mitigating the adverse effect of policy uncertainty is less pronounced 
during 2000 and 2010, when banking regulation was weaker. 
Our research is also relevant for policy makers. Government authorities are taking various actions 
to reduce the level of uncertainty in their legislative process. However, little is known on how 
financial institutions react to these uncertainties, and even less is known about how they can deal 
with the adverse effect of policy uncertainty. This paper provides evidence that access to political 
insiders is helpful in reducing the negative impact of policy uncertainty. Theoretically, political 
connections can provide banks with better access to legislative proposals under consideration and 
superior understanding of how policymakers will react to various alternatives. This is beneficial. 
However, access to political resources might also reduce the cost of making the “wrong” decision 
and induce banks to take on more risk. This moral hazard issue may harm the stability of the 
financial system and significantly increase the tax burden. 
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Loan volume Log amount of total loans normalized by CPI (2013 $1,000) Call Reports
Loss provision Log amount of loan loss provisions normalized by CPI (2013 $1,000) Call Reports
Loss provision/Loan volume Percentage ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans Call Reports
Policy uncertainty US economic policy uncertainty index minus its time-series mean and divided by its time-series standard deviation Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016)
Connected bank Dummy=1 if the bank is headquartered in a state that is represented on the Senate Banking Committee Congressional Research Service Report
Agriculture committee Dummy=1 if the bank is headquartered in a state that is represented on the Senate Agriculture Committee Congressional Research Service Report
Energy committee Dummy=1 if the bank is headquartered in a state that is represented on the Senate Energy Committee Congressional Research Service Report
Total assets Log amount of total assets normalized by CPI (2013 $1,000) Call Reports
ROA Net income scaled by total assets Call Reports
ROA volatility Standard deviation of ROA in the current and the last seven quarters Call Reports
Dividend ratio Dividends scaled by total assets Call Reports
Cash ratio Cash holdings scaled by total assets Call Reports
Distance to border Distance to a state border Holmes (1998)
Housing bubble Quarterly MSA-level median housing price growth rate Federal Housing Finance Agency
Economic recession Dummy=1 if the current quarter is defined as a recession by NBER NBER
Canada's policy uncertainty Canada economic policy uncertainty index minus its time-series mean and divided by its time-series standard deviation Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016)
Table 1. Variable definitions and sources
This table includes the variable definitions and data sources.

















Variable Obs. Mean Std. Min. Max.
Loan volume 877,448 11.331 1.395 2.385 20.525
Loss provision 877,448 5.198 1.858 -0.004 17.276
Loss provision/Loan volume 877,448 0.540 1.385 0 100
Policy uncertainty 877,448 0.010 0.928 -1.479 3.515
Connected bank 877,448 0.443 0.497 0 1
Agriculture committee 877,448 0.412 0.492 0 1
Energy committee 877,448 0.282 0.450 0 1
Total assets 877,448 11.861 1.306 7.198 21.378
ROA 877,448 0.005 0.013 -0.535 3.940
ROA volatility 877,448 0.004 0.009 0.000 1.885
Dividend ratio 877,448 0.002 0.026 -0.001 13.961
Cash ratio 877,448 0.065 0.056 -0.002 0.979
Distance to border 848,836 52.679 56.391 0 396
Housing bubble 350,915 0.007 0.020 -0.302 0.261
Economic recession 877,448 0.099 0.298 0 1
Canada's policy uncertainty 877,448 -0.083 0.918 -1.222 4.016
Table 2. Summary statistics
This table reports the summary statistics for all variables.














Unconnected bank Connected bank
Low policy uncertainty 0.348 0.480 0.132***
High policy uncertainty 0.717 0.671 -0.046***
0.369*** 0.191*** 0.178***
Table 3. Policy uncertainty, political connection, and risk taking: Univariate
This table reports the univariate results of a difference-in-differences setting. The
variable of interest is the Loss provision/Loan volume  ratio and the differences are
calculated using a t-test with unequal variance.











Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy uncertainty * Connected bank -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.027***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.004]
Policy uncertainty 0.107*** 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.123*** 0.095*** 0.097***
[0.007] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009]
Connected bank 0.023*** 0.018*** -0.008
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Total assets -0.018*** -0.001 -0.048*** -0.019*** -0.001 -0.048***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.015] [0.007] [0.008] [0.015]
ROA -31.315*** -32.424*** -26.843*** -31.275*** -32.418*** -26.832***
[4.922] [5.477] [6.259] [4.920] [5.477] [6.258]
ROA volatility 48.022*** 46.941*** 35.431*** 47.981*** 46.933*** 35.421***
[14.689] [14.302] [12.039] [14.686] [14.300] [12.035]
Dividend ratio 5.796*** 6.005*** 4.760*** 5.796*** 6.005*** 4.760***
[1.893] [1.995] [1.762] [1.894] [1.996] [1.762]
Cash ratio 0.562*** 0.437*** 0.263** 0.541*** 0.432*** 0.263**
[0.122] [0.094] [0.104] [0.120] [0.094] [0.104]
Quarter FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No No Yes No
Bank FE No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.152 0.202 0.370 0.152 0.202 0.370
Observations 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448
Table 4. Policy uncertainty, political connection, and risk taking: Multivariate
This table shows the multivariate regressions to estimate the relationship between economic policy uncertainty,
political connection, and bank risk taking. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust bank clustered standard
errors are reported below in the brackets, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. ***
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Loss provision/Loan volume





Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy uncertainty * Connected bank -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.023*** -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.017***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005]
Policy uncertainty 0.131*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.131*** 0.105*** 0.101***
[0.013] [0.017] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] [0.012]
Connected bank -0.029*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.019***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No No Yes No
Bank FE No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.120 0.174 0.338 0.114 0.167 0.342
Observations 459,587 459,587 459,587 526,057 526,057 526,057
Table 5. Policy uncertainty, political connection, and risk taking: Geographical regression discontinuity
This table shows the regressions to estimate the relationship between economic policy uncertainty, political
connection, and bank risk taking for the subsample of banks that is located within 40km/50km to the state borders.
Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust bank clustered standard errors are reported below in the brackets,
and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%.
Distance to border <= 40km Distance to border <= 50km
Loss provision/Loan volume






Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Policy uncertainty * Connected bank -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.027*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.025***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Policy uncertainty 0.123*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.123*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.123*** 0.096*** 0.097***
[0.009] [0.011] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010]
Connected bank 0.028*** 0.018*** -0.009 0.031*** 0.021*** -0.005 0.035*** 0.021*** -0.005
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Bank FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.152 0.202 0.371 0.147 0.198 0.370 0.146 0.197 0.371
Observations 860,491 860,491 860,491 800,111 800,111 800,111 783,154 783,154 783,154
Table 6. Policy uncertainty, political connection, and risk taking: States subsample
Loss provision/Loan volume
States excluding NY Ever-connected states excluding
This table shows the regressions to estimate the relationship between economic policy uncertainty, political connection, and bank risk taking for
subsample of states. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust bank clustered standard errors are reported below in the brackets, and the
corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Ever-connected states






Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy uncertainty * Connected bank 0.003 0.007 0.008* -0.001 0.004 0.002
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Policy uncertainty 0.105*** 0.078*** 0.082*** 0.108*** 0.082*** 0.085***
[0.009] [0.011] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.008]
Connected bank 0.022** 0.013** 0.024*** -0.001 -0.050*** -0.046***
[0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No No Yes No
Bank FE No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.152 0.202 0.370 0.152 0.202 0.370
Observations 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448
Table 7. Policy uncertainty, political connection, and risk taking: Placebo test
Loss provision/Loan volume
Agriculture committee
This table shows the regressions to estimate the relationship between economic policy uncertainty, political
connection, and bank risk taking for other important senate committees including agriculture and energy.
Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust bank clustered standard errors are reported below in the brackets,
and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%.
Energy committee









Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy uncertainty * Connected bank -0.015* -0.008 -0.007 -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.031***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004]
Policy uncertainty 0.138*** 0.102*** 0.095*** 0.119*** 0.092*** 0.086***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.009] [0.011] [0.008]
Connected bank 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.022* 0.009 0.003 -0.018***
[0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No No Yes No
Bank FE No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.089 0.158 0.378 0.196 0.241 0.424
Observations 219,433 219,433 219,433 658,015 658,015 658,015
Table 8. Policy uncertainty, political connection, and risk taking: Bank size
Loss provision/Loan volume
Larger banks (assets >= 75 percentile) Smaller banks (assets < 75 percentile)
This table shows the regressions to estimate the relationship between economic policy uncertainty, political connection, and bank
risk taking for the subsample of large and small banks separately. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust bank clustered
standard errors are reported below in the brackets, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. ***
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.








Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Policy uncertainty * Connected bank -0.079*** -0.085*** -0.076*** -0.017** -0.022*** -0.009 -0.012* -0.024*** -0.026***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Policy uncertainty 0.263*** 0.242*** 0.178*** 0.113*** 0.083*** 0.078*** 0.175*** 0.107*** 0.103***
[0.012] [0.013] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Connected bank -0.039*** -0.113*** -0.095*** 0.026* 0.028 0.005 -0.005 0.002 0.022
[0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.013] [0.019] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] [0.015]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Bank FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.162 0.224 0.383 0.196 0.229 0.519 0.226 0.296 0.548
Observations 544,140 544,140 544,140 247,864 247,864 247,864 85,444 85,444 85,444
Table 9. Policy uncertainty, political connection, and risk taking: Time periods
Loss provision/Loan volume
Pre-2000 Post-2010
This table shows the regressions to estimate the relationship between economic policy uncertainty, political connection, and bank risk taking for the
subsample before and after year 2000 separately. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust bank clustered standard errors are reported below in
the brackets, and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Between 2000 and 2010








Figure 1. Time trends of economic policy uncertainty























































































































































































































































Figure 2. Correlation between bank density and banking committee representation






























































































































































































































































































































Likelihood of senate banking committee representation














Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy uncertainty * Connected bank 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.014*** -0.034*** -0.025*** -0.022***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Policy uncertainty -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 0.263*** 0.236*** 0.242***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006]
Connected bank -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.025*** 0.043*** 0.059*** 0.023***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No No Yes No
Bank FE No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.953 0.956 0.981 0.544 0.640 0.738
Observations 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448
Table A1. Policy uncertainty, political connection, and risk taking: Decomposition
Loan volume Loss provision
This table shows the decomposition of Loss provision/Loan volume  ratio. Coefficients are listed in the first
row, robust bank clustered standard errors are reported below in the brackets, and the corresponding
significance levels are placed adjacently. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.







Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy uncertainty * Connected bank -0.025*** -0.018*** -0.026*** -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.027***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005]
Policy uncertainty -0.031*** -0.032*** 0.180*** 0.004
[0.003] [0.003] [0.059] [0.038]
Connected bank -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.024*** 0.022*** -0.006
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interacted controls No No No No Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes No No No No
Year * Quarter FE No No Yes Yes No No
State FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Bank FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.224 0.382 0.235 0.394 0.209 0.377
Observations 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448
Table A2. Policy uncertainty, political connection, and bank risk taking: Stricter FE and controls
This table shows the regressions to estimate the relationship between economic policy uncertainty, political
connection, and bank risk taking with stricter fixed effects or a set of interacted controls.Coefficients are listed in
the first row, robust bank clustered standard errors are reported below in the brackets, and the corresponding
significance levels are placed adjacently. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Loss provision/Loan volume








Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Policy uncertainty * Connected bank -0.017** -0.020*** -0.012* -0.049*** -0.044*** -0.035*** -0.071*** -0.080*** -0.078***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
Policy uncertainty 0.093*** 0.071*** 0.081*** 0.141*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.025*** 0.217*** 0.188***
[0.012] [0.014] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009] [0.014] [0.015] [0.011]
Housing bubble * Connected bank -1.000** -0.520 0.330
[0.418] [0.396] [0.336]
Housing bubble -4.837*** -4.343*** -4.078***
[0.773] [0.735] [0.496]
Economic recession * Connected bank 0.129*** 0.085*** 0.078***
[0.014] [0.012] [0.011]
Economic recession -0.181*** -0.153*** -0.107***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Canada's policy uncertainty * Connected bank 0.049*** 0.060*** 0.071***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006]
Canada's policy uncertainty -0.127*** -0.192*** -0.142***
[0.009] [0.008] [0.005]
Connected bank 0.076*** 0.056*** 0.020* 0.010 0.007 -0.017*** 0.027*** 0.020*** -0.002
[0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Bank FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.138 0.187 0.411 0.153 0.203 0.370 0.155 0.209 0.373
Observations 350,915 350,915 350,915 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448 877,448
Table A3. Policy uncertainty, political connection, and risk taking: Economic conditions
Loss provision/Loan volume
This table shows the regressions to estimate the relationship between economic policy uncertainty, political connection, and bank risk taking whle controlling
for various measures of economic conditions. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust bank clustered standard errors are reported below in the brackets,
and the corresponding significance levels are placed adjacently. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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